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THE UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE AND THE
NORTH DAKOTA LAW OF EVIDENCE (Continued)
By LEO H. WHINERY*
JUDICIAL NOTICE'
I. Some Preliminary Observations -
The doctrine of judicial notice-that is, the acceptance of a
proposition as true without requiring formal proof to establish it-
is essential in the adjudication of legal controversy. ' Viewed as a
necessary perceptive element in every decisional process, it does
not relate to the law of evidence at all. Rather, in the words of
Thayer, it involves " . . the exercise of the function of the judica-
ture in all its scope and at every step."4 Courts could not function
in the settlement of disputes if the judge did not know the law
and the judge and jury did not possess the information common to
all intelligent men with the capacity to use processes of reasoning.
In addition, there are many matters of law and fact which judge
or jury may not know offhand, but which can be ascertained by
consulting authoritative reference materials in common use at the
time. To permit the applicable law to vary from that which it is
known or can be ascertained to be or to permit the parties to dis-
pute matters of fact the truth of which is commonly known or
readily ascertainable, is to hazard a result contrary to the rational
administration of justice.5 Moreover, in some instances it would be
ridiculous and, in others, a sheer waste of time. The fact-finding
and law-applying process necessarily requires reliance upon law
and fact in every phase of the law suit the tenor of which is not -
or reasonably could be-the subject of dispute. If indisputable it
belongs to the realm of judicial notice; if not,it should be relegated
to the formal methods of proof.
The relationship of the doctrine of judicial notice to the law of
evidence can be seen more clearly in the application of its two
most important consequences: (1) the elimination of the necessity
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Dakota.
1. Other comparisons of the judicial notice provisions of the Uniform Rules of Evidence
and state law include Laughlin, Judicial Notice, 40 Minn. L. Rev. 365 (1956) and Knowl-
ton, Judicial Notice, 10 Rutgers L. Rev. 501 (1956).
2. This analysis should be compared with Morgan, Some Problems of Proof Under the
Anglo-American System of Litigation, 36-69 (1956). For an earlier treatment of the sub-
ject by Professor Morgan, see Judicial Notice, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 269 (1944).
3. 9 Wigre, Evidence §§ 2565-2566 (3d ed. 1940); McCormick, Evidence 687-
(1954). Hereinafter cited as Wigmore and McCormick respectively.
4. Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence 279 (1898).
5. See Power v. Bowdle, 3 N.D. 107, 54 N.W. 404, 408 (1893).
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of a party having the burden of establishing a fact from producing
formal proof of that fact;' and (2) the prevailing view that a fact
judically noticed may not be disputed by contradictory evidence.'
Much of that accepted by judge and jury as indisputable without
proof would never be disputed by the parties. The question may
arise whether a fact is indisputable. The problem then becomes one
of determining whether the fact is such that it may be noticed
or it must be submitted to proof through an application of the
recognized rules of evidence. This calls for a distinct level of in-
vestigation, the termination of which will result in the acceptance
of the fact as true or the submission of the issues to the ordinary
process of proof. It is in the end result that the relationship between
judicial notice and the rules of evidence is observed-establishing
the existence of a fact to the satisfaction of the tribunal. As to this
aspect of the doctrine, it is instructive to observe that Uniform Rule
1(8) defines a "finding of fact" as ". . . the determination from
proof or judicial notice of the existence of a fact."*
Finally, it should be recognized that the personal knowledge of
the judge or jury is not necessarily co-extensive with their judicial
knowledge. 9 The judge may personally be unaware of the tenor
of a particular law. But he will take judicial notice of that law
because it is through his special competence that the tenor of the
law must be known or ascertained. Or, judge and jury may per-
sonally be unaware of specific facts and propositions of generalized
knowledge. They are nevertheless warranted in taking judicial
notice of such facts if their existence is established. The personal
iknowledge of the judge and jury may-and often does-coincide
with their judicial knowledge. Matters of law and fact are applied
throughout every step of the lawsuit of which judge and jury have
-personal knowledge and to which the formal methods of proof
.are not utilized. But judicial notice is applied because the exist-
ence of the law is within the special competence of the court or the
existence of the fact could not reasonably be questioned. Personal
knowledge alone is not sufficient grounds for an application of the
doctrine. The distinction is not always easy to apply, but it is
sound in theory and well recognized: 0
6. 9 W.gmore, § 2565; McCormick, 687.
7. McCormick, 711.
8. The complete text of Rule 1(8) reads: "'Finding of fact' means the determination
from proof or judicial notice of the existence of a fact. A ruling implies a supporting find-
ing of fact; no separate or formal finding is required unless required by a statute of this
state."9. 9 Wigmore, 062569-2570.
10. McCormick, 690.
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The criteria for determining those matters of which the court
must and those of which it may take judicial notice can now be
distinguished. A resort to the distinction between judicial notice as
an element of judicial reasoning and judicial notice as a distinct
method of proof provides the key to understanding. It has been
said that courts could not function if judges did not know the law.
This does not mean that the judge must personally know and apply
the applicable law, whether it be a statute, common law rule, ordi-
nance, or administrative rule, regulation, or decision. It does mean,
in theory at least, that he must take judicial notice of all law appli-
cable to the controversy." However, there may be practical limita-
tions in, certain cases which require a modification of that which
is sound in theory. As to domestic law, the prevailing rule requires
the judge to take judicial notice of the applicable statutory or
common law rule.12 The failure to do so will not always result
in reversible error since it may be due to counsel's failure to call it
to the judge's attention or by otherwise misleading him.13 Any
other rule than one of compulsory judicial notice as to domestic
statutes and common law rules would be contrary to good reason.
Should a similar rule follow with respect to private acts, ordinances
and administrative rules, regulations and decisions of the domestic
jurisdiction? Should such laws as these of foreign jurisdictions
together with their public statutes and common law rules be the
subject of compulsory judicial notice? We will see later that con-
flicting views have been expressed on the question of where the
line should be drawn between compulsory and discretionary judicial
notice of matters of law."4 However, it is submitted that these
are not derived from basic disagreement on the theory that all
law must be noticed, but upon varying attitudes regarding the
practical limitations of such a rule. Thus, the :unavailability of
source materials and/or justifiable lack of familarity with the sub-
ject matter may require a more flexible rule which gives the judge
discretion to determine whether the law should be noticed or
submitted to formal proof.
The same analysis applies to judicial notice of matters of fact. In
theory all matters of fact which cannot reasonably be disputed
must be noticed. In application, such a rule would be unworkable.
Both judge and jury must be assumed to have the fund of relevant
11. Compare McCormick, i326.
12. Ibid.
13. For a more complete discussion of the doctrine of invited error, see Morgan, op. ciu.
supra note 2, at 44-45.
14. See pages 22-30 intra.
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information common to all intelligent men and possess ordinary
processes of rational thought. It is essential to their respective roles
in the judicial process. The ordinary meaning of language and
well known facts pertaining to time, the familar laws of nature,
and so on, must be applied in every decisional process. Proof is
not needed nor would the propriety of notice ordinarily be ques-
tioned. It is here that the personal and judicial knowledge of judge
and jury is usually coextensive and any other rule than one which
requires judicial notice of such matters of fact would be contrary
to the basic theory of judicial notice as essential to judicial reason-
ing. But the same rule cannot be sustained as to all matters of fact.
There are facts to which judicial notice is applicable but where
the notoriety thereof may or may not be known to judge or jury.
Under such circumstances it would be unreasonable to require judi-
cial notice of such a fact until the judge is satisfied that it is one
which falls within the domain of the doctrine. He may, without
making an investigation or asking the parties for information, notice
the fact because he is familiar with its notoriety and instruct the jury
accordingly. Or, he may be in doubt and require the parties to
present informal data as a basis for his finding that the fact will
either be noticed or submitted to formal proof.
It is also in this area of discretionary judicial notice-both as to
matters of law and fact -that the need for a party request is im-
portant. Where a matter of law or fact falls within the domain of
discretionary judicial notice the judge can and often will apply the
doctrine of his own motion. But the nature of the law or fact in
the particular case may be such that he is not-or reasonably
could be expected to be-familiar with that law or the existence
of the fact. In such circumstances, the parties should also be per-
mitted to initiate an application of the doctrine. A request by a
party should then result in a mandatory application of the doctrine
providing he furnishes the judge with sufficient information to
enable him to meet the request. But a request should not in all
cases be a condition precedent to the application of judicial notice
as Professor Wigmore suggests. 5 On the contrary, the prevailing
rule does not require a party request as a condition to judicial
notice of the domestic law and matters of common knowledge.;
A rational administration of justice would be impossible without
recognizing a legitimate area in which the doctrine may operate
sua sponte.
15. 9 Wigmore, §2568.
16. McCormick, §330.
[VOL. 33
UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE
These preliminary observations concerning the rationale of
judicial notice provide a convenient framework within which to
make a comparative analysis of the Uniform Rules and the North
Dakota law. Some of them are controversial, but they will be con-
sidered more conveniently in the discussion of particular rules.
First, a more general understanding of the comparative approach
in the Rules and the North Dakota law is necessary.
II. The Basic Approach in the Rules and the Law
Uniform Rules 9 through 12 deal with the subject and, with a
few changes, are based on similar provisions of the Model Code."
Rule 9 classifies the subject-matter of judicial notice; 10 provides
for a hearing on the propriety of notice, the source material to be
consulted and that the exclusionary rules shall not be applicable
thereto, and that questions of law are questions for the court; 11
relates to the judge's instructions to the jury on matters of fact
judicially noticed; and 12 provides for notice of matters in subse-
qient proceedings in an action, review and judicial notice by a
reviewing court subject to the conditions imposed in Rule 10.
Chapter 31-10 of the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943
contains the provisions applicable to judicial notice in North Da-
kota. Section 31-1001 deals with the procedural incidents; Section
31-1C02 enumerates in ninety-two subdivisions the facts subject to
judicial notice; and Sections 31-1003 to 31-1005 govern notice of
foreign law. In addition, there are special statutes which provide
for judicial notice of private statutes," municipal corporations,'
ordinances, 2 and confiscatory farm prices.' An analysis of the
North Dakota statutes and the applicable case law necessarily re-
sults in the preliminary observation that the law of North Dakota
on judicial notice is inadequate.
New directions for growth in the law need to be found in the
form. of more adequate and easier to apply rules prescribing the
subject-matter of judicial notice together with a clearer formula-
tion of the conditions under which the doctrine will be applied. A
more precise formulation of the procedural safeguards is needed.
These must include rules which give the parties reasonable oppor-
tunity to be heard and present informal materials on the propriety
of notice, an articulation of the respective roles of judge and jury,
17. Model Code of Evidence rules 801-806 (1942), hereinafter cited as the Model Code.
18. N.D. Rev. Code § 28-0730 (1943).
19. Id. at 40-0103.
20. Id. at 40-1819,
21. Id. at * 28-2906.
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provision for review, and rules governing the use of judicial notice
by the reviewing court. Uniform Rules ;9 through 1.2 meet these
general requirements. We will also find that their adoption-
with such specific changes as may be fo~ind advisable -would
result in a change for the better in North Dakota.
Rule 9 of the Uniform Rules is the basic rule. It provides:
"RULE 9. Facts Which Must or May Be Judicially Noticed.
(1) Judicial notice shall be taken without request by a
party, of the common law, constitutions and public statutes in
torce in every state, territory and jurisdiction of the United
States, and of such specific facts and propositions of general-
ized knowledge as are so universally known that they cannot
reasonably be the subject of dispute.
(2) Judicial notice may be taken without request by a party,
of (a) private acts and resolutions of the Congress of the
United States and of the legislature of this state, and duly
enacted ordinances and duly published regulations of govern-
mental subdivisions or agencies of this state, and (b) the laws
of foreign countries, and (c) such facts as are so generally
known or of such common notoriety within the territorial juris-
diction of the court that they cannot reasonably be the subject
of dispute, and (d) specific facts and propositions of general-
ized knowledge which are capable of immediate and accurate
determination by resort to easily accessible sources of indis-
putable accuracy.
(3) Judicial notice shall be taken of each matter specified in
paragraph (2) of this rule if a party requests it and (a) fur-
nishes the judge sufficient information to enable him properly
to comply with the request and (b) has given each adverse
party such notice as the judge may require to enable the ad-
verse party to prepare to meet the request."
First, it will be observed that this rule classifies the subject-
matter of judicial notice in general rules. It thus manifests the
more acceptable approach of notoriety or verifiability of fact as
distinguished from the North Dakota statutory approach of pre-
cedent for fact as determinative of an application of the doctrine.2
North Dakota follows the practice often adopted in the codes
of attempting an enumeration .of the facts of which a court will
take judicial notice." The enumeration in Section 31-1002 of the
Code ranges from the specific, guch as "the inflammable character
of kerosene, gin, turpentine, and the like"24 and "the facts stated in
the almanac and of the days of the week, as shown thereby" 2 5 to
22. 9 Wigmore, 12583.
23. Id. at 12571 at note 1.
24. N.D. Rev. Code 131-1002, subd. 61 (1943).
;5. Id. at subd. 22.
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the more general, such as "the laws of nature, the measure of time,
and the geographical divisions and political history of the world"-
and "such matters of common knowledge and science as may be
known to all men of ordinary understanding and intelligence."
2 7
The statute - with minor revisions - has remained in force in the
State since its enactment in 1897.28 It is inadequate for two related
reasons: (1) the attempted enumeration of facts ignores the basic
rationale of judicial notice which, in turn; (2) has led to incon-
gruous results in the application of the statute.
If it is conceded that judicial notice is essential to a rational ad-
ministration of justice, then its application must be permitted to
expand to encompass facts which new times and new conditions
will create. Fortunately the statute is saved from unqualified
criticism by those subdivisions specifying general classes of facts
which North Dakota courts will notice. But what of those matters
of fact for which no statutory precedent can be found? Or, per-
haps a particular fact may reasonably fall within that realm of
things of which the court should take judicial notice. Should the
negative search for statutory precedent result in a denial of the
application of judicial notice? It would be absurd to suggest that
the statute should, in every case, so operate. However, in Wickum
'. Arneson, the defendant sought. unsuccessfully judicial notice of
the evidence in a prior proceeding between the parties.-' The
court said:
"Section 7937, Comp. Laws 1913, [Section 31-1002] in its
enumeration of facts of which the court will take judicial
notice, does not include the evidence by which issues in the
former action were resolved one way or another."30
In a later case, the Court has said that the statute "controls as to
those matters of which a court will take judicial notice."' But
this has been neither the consistent interpretation of the sttute or
the result achieved in the application of judicial notice in North
Dakota.
In the earlier case of State ex rel. Erickson v. Burr, the court took
judicial notice of the journals of the legislature pursuant to the
statute. 12 In the course of its opinion, the Court made it quite clear
26. Id. at subd. 92.
27. Id. at subd. 84.
28. The prior legislation may be found in the following sources: N.D. Comp. Laws
1§7937-7938 (1913); N.D. Rev. Code §§7318-7319 (1905); N.D. Rev. Code
15713 (1899); and N.D. Sess. Laws, c. 65, §§ 1-13 (1897).
29. 63 N.D, 594, 249 N.W. 709 (1933).
30. Id. at 710.
31. In re McKee's Estate, 67 N.D. 504, 274 N.W. 601 (1937).
32. 16 N.D. 581, 113 N.W. 705 (1907).
1957J
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
that even if the statute had not so provided it would not have been
prevented from noticing the journals. 3 This is the only sensible
interpretation if the legislative approach must be one of enumerat-
ing facts. Such statutes should never be deemed exclusive. 4 In-
deed, it is important to note that of the known reported cases in
the State in which the doctrine has been expressly applied, the
courts have done so in the majority of them without reference to
the statute. Admittedly, the Court would have found precedent
for most of these in those subdivisions of the statute which author-
ize judicial notice "[o]f such matters of common knowledge and
science as may be known to all men of ordinary understanding and
i, itelligence": and "[o]f whatever ought to be known generally
within the limits of the court's jurisdiction."31 However, it would
find no statutory precedent for taking judicial notice of mortality
tables without indulging in the fiction that life expectancies are
matters of common knowledge.3
7
Both the Wickum Case and the one following it deal with judi-
cial notice of evidence in prior proceedings - an area into which
the courts of the United States have been reluctant to extend the
doctrine. 8 Even if it is believed that the Court was correct in
refusing to apply judicial notice to such facts, it could not be
argued seriously that the court's interpretation of Section 31-1002
was proper. An attempted statutory enumeration of facts subject
to judicial notice is a questionable approach; to place an exclusive
interpretation upon such a statute is to further weaken the useful-
ness of the doctrine. An ameliorating influence is found in the
dicta of the Erickson Case alluding to the non-exclusive nature of
Section 31-1002.3 1 This is further supported by those decisions
utilizing the doctrine without relying upon the statute. But the un-
fortunate result is a body of conflicting authorities regarding the
application of judicial notice in the State. The need for revision is
emphasized accordingly.
Second, what is the status of the North Dakota law relating to
the distinction which the Uniform Rules make between compul-
sory, discretionary, and compulsory judicial notice upon a party
13. Id. at 710.
34. 9 Wigmore, 0 2571 at note 1.
35. N. D. Rev. Code § 31-1002, subd. 84 (1943).
36. Id. at subd. 49.
37. Schultz v. Winston & Newell Co., 68 N.D. 674, 283 N.W. 69 (1938); Chambers v.
Minneapolis, St. & S.S.M. Ry. Co., 37 N.D. 377, 163 N.W. 824 (1917); Rober v. Northern
Pac. Ry. Co., 25 N.D. 394, 142 N.W. 22 (1913); and Ruehl v. Lidgerwood Rural Tele-
phone Co., 23 N.D. 6, 135 N.W. 793 (1912). See page 19 intra.
38. McCormick, 701. See page 33 infra.
39. See note 32 supra.
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request? Section 31-1002 is further weakened as a result of the
conflicting authorities on the question of whether under Section
31-1002- the companion provision-a party must request the
court to take judicial notice before Section 31-10(2 will be applied.
It has also resulted in considerable confusion concerning the dis-
tinction between those matters of which the court shall, may, or
shall on request, take judicial notice. Section 31-1002 reads:
"No evidence of any fact of which the courts take judicial
notice need be given in any civil or criminal action or proceed-
ing pending in this state by the party alleging its existence,
but any judge asked to take judicial notice thereof, if unac-
quainted with such fact, may refer to any person, document, or
book of reference for his satisfaction in relation thereto, or may
refuse to take judicial notice thereof unless and until the party
making the request produces any such document or book of
reference."
In the early case of Amundson v. Wilson, the plaintiff brought an
action to set aside a deed to certain real estate on the grounds that
the conveyance was made to defraud the plaintiff and prevent the
collection of a prior judgment.4" The plaintiff did not prove the
prior judgment but contended on appeal that the trial court should
have taken judicial notice of the judgment under the statute.4 ' In
ruling otherwise, the court said:
* * * "rtlhe language of this section is plain that the judge
is to be called upon to take judicial notice of certain facts ap-
pearing in . . . [the court's] record before he is to take such
notice of such facts. The trial judge is not bound by such
section to take judicial notice of any fact of his own motion.
The party desiring the benefit of not being compelled to offer
evidence of such fact must inform the court and opposing
counsel that the provisions of the statute are relied on. Then
the court elects whether it will take judicial notice of the fact
suggested or not." * 0 042
Similarly, the latest of two subsequent decisions on the point
follows the Amundson Case in restricting the use of judicial notice
tinder Section 31-1002. The Court said in In re McKee's Estate:
"The statute, section 7937 [now Section 31-1002] . . . con-
trols as to those matters of which a court will take judicial
notice. Its purport is merely that while a court may take
judicial notice of those matters and things therein enumerated,
it will do so only when requested and when they are relevant
to some matter in issue. The purpose behind the theory of
judicial notice is to relieve the party who requests it from
40. 11 N.D. 193, 91 N.W. 37 (1902).
41. N.D. Rev. Code §5713(d), subd. 14 and 19 (1899). For the satnt provisions in
the present revision, see N.D. R,-v. Code §§ :11-1001 and 31-101)2, subd. 2, 20 (1943).
42. See note 40, supra at 194, 38.
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proof; and he must request it. The wording of the statute
makes this plain.."4
3
An application of the interpretation of the Supreme Court in the
Amundson Case and McKee's Estate to the facts enumerated in
Section 31-1002 is not warranted by either the basic notions con-
cerning the use of judicial notice nor supported by the authorities
in North Dakota. Compulsory judicial notice of the public laws by
the courts of North Dakota would not be questioned. Yet this is
one of the facts enumerated in the statute of which the courts will
take judicial notice."4 In a case decided thirteen years after the
Amundson Case, the Court held, pursuant to the statute, that the
fact of incorporation of the village of Page would be noticed.":
There is no intimation in the opinion that a request was either
desirable or required. The same is true in three later decisions in-
volving judicial notice "[o]f the limits of a county and the fact that
a place proved was within such limits", one of which was decided
eleven years after McKee's Estate.4" Nor is a request needed for a
North Dakota court to take judicial notice that alcohol is an in-
toxicating liquor.
4 "
Here again, the Amundson Case and those following it may be
explained partially on the reluctance of courts generally to notice
proceedings in prior cases. ' Consequently, more rigid require-
ments for an application of the doctrine under Section 31-1002
were insisted upon by the Court. But it does not remedy the ex-
isting confusion created by the conflicting authorities as to the need
for a party request in the application of Section 31-1002.
The status quo is further complicated by the cases applying
judicial notice without reference to the statutory precedent. A few
43. 676 N. D. 504, 274 N.W. 601, 604 (1937); cf. Stead v. Manhart, 48 N. D. 536,
185 N.W. 1009 (1921).
44. N.D. Rev. Code §31-1002, subd. 63 (1943).
45. Village of Page v. Farmery, 29 N.D. 209, 150 N.W. 471 (1915), applying Comp.
Laws §7938, subd. 18 (1913). For the present statutory provision see N.D. Rev. Code
§31-1002, subd. 39 (1943).
46. N. D. Rev. Code § 31-1002, subd., (1913). State v. Seeb, 76 N. D. 473, 37 N.W.2d
341 (1949). See also, State v. Olson, 61 N.D. 699, 240 N.W. 617 (1932) and State v.
Martin, 54 N.D. 840, 211 N.W. 585 (1926), applying Comp. Laws §7938, subd. (1913),
the prior provision.
47. N.D. Rev. Code §31-1002, subd. 74 (1943), State v. McCauley, 68 N.D. 198,
277 N.W. 605 (1938), applying Comp. Laws §7938 (1913), the prior provision.
48. See note 38 supra. It may also be important to note that prior to the 1943 revision
of the Code, the now Section 31-1001 was a part of Section 7937 which also contained
twenty subdivisions relating to judicial notice of facts pertaining to the jurisdiction, per-
sonnel and records of courts of which records in prior proceedings was one. The other
matters subject to judicial notice were enumerated in the separate Section 7938. Hence,
the argument that the court's irtcrpretat:on would only be a precedent for the matters
enumerated in Section 7937.However, it would appear that the Code Revision Committee
for the 1943 Code did not believe the now Section 31-1001 applied only to matters of
fact, relating to jurisdiction, personnel and court records. See the revisor's notes in N.D.
Revision Report §§31-1001-31-1005 (1943).
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cases have been more explicit than others regarding the fact that a
party request is not always needed. In an early case, the Court
found that it must - upon its own motion - notice matters of com-
mon knowledge within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court.4
In other cases, the court has said that judicial notice may be taken
of matters of common knowledge irrespective of whether a request
is made.' A comparison of these decisions with subdivision 84 of
Section 31-1002 which authorize judicial notice of matters of com-
mon knowledge and the interpretation given Section 31-1002 in
McKee's Estate results in a paradox.
The conflict in authorities frustrates the articulation of a general
rule, or rules, in North Dakota governing the compulsory, discre-
tionary or party request application of judicial notice. A reference
to the specific statutory and case precedent dealing with the type
of fact involved must be made in each instance to determine the
circumstances of application. Obviously, the court necessarily
takes judicial notice of those matters of domestic law and common
knowledge without which it would be impossible to function. Be-
yond this, when counsel seeks to rely upon the doctrine under exist-
ing law, the safe practice would be to request the court to notice
the matter. Even then it is not entirely clear as to whether the
court would be obligated to honor the request even if counsel had
authoritative supporting data.51
The Uniform Rules would be an improvement in this respect.
Compulsory judicial notice as to public law and "universal" knowl-
edge is recognized as essential to the functioning of courts in the
judicial process; discretionary judicial notice is provided for as to
those matters of law and fact which courts ought, but should not
be compelled, to notice because the nature of the law or fact may
be such that the court could not be expected to be familiar with its
notoriety; and, in such cases, the Rules further permit a party to
initiate an application of the doctrine. If a request is made the
judge is bound to honor it providing the conditions in Rule 9(3)
are met and if, under Rule (10)3, he is satisfied that the matter
falls within the scope of the doctrine as provided in Rule 9..2
49. Power v. Bowdle, 3 N. D. 107, 54 N.W. 404 (1893).
50. Cf. Chambers v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. Ry. Co., 37 N.D. 377, 163 N.W. 824
(1917). Ruehl v. Lidgerwood Rural Telephone Co., 23 N.D. 6, 135 N.W. 793 (1912);
Rober v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 25 N.D. 394, 142 N.W. 22 (1913); Schultz v. Winston
and Newell Co., 68 N.W. 674, 283 N.W. 69 (1938).
51. See Amundson v. Wilson, 11 N.D. 193, 91 N.W. 37 (1902), wherein the court
said it "elects whether it will take judicial notice of the fact" after a request had been
made. See page 13 supra.
52. See page 31 intra.
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The North Dakota law may be clear on a basis of specific statu-
tory and case precedent as to the subject matter of judicial notice
and the circumstances tinder which it will be applied by the courts.
Viewed in perspective the doctrine is confusing and difficult to
apply. Uniform Rule 9 would be a decided improvement over the
present law in its basic approach to the subject. More general
formulation classify the facts subject to judicial notice which per-
mit needed flexibility in the application of judicial notice to new
facts in changed circumstances and changing times. In addition,
tl.e initiating factors in the use of the doctrine are clearly set forth.
The basic plan of the Uniform Rules is superior to the law of North
Dakota.
III. Judicial Notice of Facts
Matters of Common Knowledge. Uniform Rule 9(1) provides
that "such specific facts and propositions of generalized knowledge
as are so universally known that they cannot reasonably be the
subject of dispute" shall be noticed. This rule, as in the Model Code,
distinguishes between "propositions of generalized knowledge" and
'specific facts". But in the Uniform rule it should be noted that
both classes of facts are subject to compulsory judicial notice. In
the Model Code "propositions of generalized knowledge" are made
the subject of compulsory judicial notice,"s while it is discretionary
with the court as to whether "specific facts" will be noticed. 4 The
formulation in the Uniform Rules appears to be the better of the
two. Facts falling within both classes are necessarily applied at
every step of the decisional process - proof of such facts is not
needed and would ordinarily be rejected if it were offered. The con-
sequent compulsory application of judicial notice should then ne-
cessarily extend to both "propositions of generalized knowledge"
anid "specific facts" of equal notoriety. A court would notice that
poisons taken in sufficient quantities would cause serious injuries."5
More specifically, it should notice that arsenic taken in sufficient
quantities would cause serious injuries. The same is true as to the
navigability of a large number of rivers in the United States as con-
trasted with the navigability of the Mississippi River. If the fact is
one of general notoriety - or, as in the Uniform Rule, "universally
53. Model Code rule 801. "The judge shall of his own motive take judicial notice ...
of such propositions of generalized knowledge as are so notorious as not to be the subject
of reasonable dispute."
54. Id. at rule 802. "The judge may of his own motion take judicial notice of . .
(b) specific facts so notorious as not to be the subject of reasonable dispute ..
55. McGurren v. City of Fargo, 66 N.W.2d 207 (N.D. 1954).
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known" -it should be noticed irrespective of whether the fact is
a "proposition of generalized knowledge" or a "specific fact".
Pursuant to Section 31-1002 of the Code, North Dakota courts
will take judicial notice "[o]f such matters of common knowledge
as may be known to all men of ordinary understanding and intelli-
gence" and such other facts of general notoriety as are listed in the
statute."' The distinction between "propositions of generalized
knowledge" and "specific facts" in the Uniform rule is not recog-
nized as such in North Dakota. But it is to be observed that the
enumeration in Section 31-1002 of facts subject to judicial notice
and the application of the doctrine in the decisions extends to both
general and specific facts of general notoriety. For example, the
statute authorizes judicial notice "[o]f the unvarying occurrences of
the climate and the seasons" 57 and "[o] f the history of a country, its
topography, and general condition"" as distinguished from judicial
notice of the fact "[t]hat whiskey, brandy, and alcohol are intoxi-
cating liquors""9 and that "nitro-glycerine, dynamite, gunpowder,
and guncotton" have an explosive character."" The same distinction
in the application of the doctrine is illustrated by one case in which
the Supreme Court noticed that accumulations of household waste
matter might become a fire hazard-" as contrasted with another in
which the court noticed that South Dakota is a sovereign state of
the United States.
62
As to matters of common knowledge, the Uniform Rules further
provide in Rule 9(2) that a court may take judicial notice of "such
facts as are so generally known or of such common notoriety within
the territorial jurisdiction of the court that they cannot reasonably
be the subject of dispute."'6 The distinction between facts "uni-
versally known" as in Rule 9(1) and "facts . . . within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court" as in Rule 9(2) is clear enough. The
difficulty with the criteria of "universality" as to those matters of
fact subject to compulsory judicial notice under Rule 9( 1) is that
it fictionalizes the real basis for taking judicial notice of matters of
common knowledge having general notoriety."4 In other words, the
56. N.D. Rev. Code §31-1002, subd. 84 (1943).
57. Id. at subd. 27.
58. Id. at subd. 54.
59. Id. at subd. 74.
60. Id. at subd. 62.
61. Tayloe v. City of Wahpeton et al., 62 N.W.2d 31 (N.D. 1953).
62. Paulus v. State of South Dakota, 58 N.D. 643, 227 N.W. 52 (1929).
63. A similar provision will not be found in the Model Code. That part of Uniform Rule
9(2) providing for notice of facts within the territorial jurisdiction of the court is substi-
tuted for Model Code rule 802(b) which provides that judicial notice may be taken of
"specific facts so notorious as not to be the subject of reasonable dispute."
64. McCormick, 689.
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requirement for compulsory notice of facts is met if the general
notoriety of the fact is established." It would appear that the termi-
nology "universally known" was incorporated in Rule 9(1) to clear-
ly distinguish the basis for compulsory judicial notice from the dis-
cretionary application of the doctrine under Rule 9(2) as to facts
of "common notoriety within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court." But the distinction between the two bases for judicial notice
would still be clear if the qualifying phrase "territorial jurisdiction
of the court" were retained in Rule 9(2) and the somewhat loose
description of "universally known" facts in Rule 9( 1) was replaced
with the criteria of "general notoriety".
Section 31-1002 of the Code contains a provision similar to that
in Rule 9(2). It provides that the North Dakota courts will take
judicial notice "[o] f whatever ought to be known generally within
the limits of the court's jurisdiction.""" In addition, other subdivis-
ions of the statute specify certain facts which would also fall within
the limits of this broader rule. Also, the judicial authorities include
notice by the Supreme Court that there is a slump in real estate
values in the State at or during a certain period,'67 that a severe de-
pression existed in North Dakota from 1930 to 1940," and that
drought acreage in the western part of the state can be made pro-
ductive through irrigation. "' An application of the principle on the
local level is illustrated by the authorities approving of the trial
courts' action in taking judicial notice of the boundary lines of its
jurisdiction and that an act done or crime committed within such
boundary lines is within its jurisdiction.71
Matters of Verifiable Certainty. The Uniform Rules also provide
in Rule 9(2) that the courts may take judicial notice of "specific
facts and propositions of generalized knowledge which are capable
of immediate and accurate determination by resort to easily acces-
sible sources of indisputable accuracy."7 This basis for judicial
notice is receiving increasing recognition throughout the country.7 2
Common knowledge is a necessary but limited basis upon which to
make an intelligent use of the doctrine. Many facts which are not
65. Ibid.
66. N.D. Rev. Code 031-1002, subd. 49 (1943).
67. Skachenko v. Sweetman et al., 77 N.D. 502, 43 N.W.2d 683 (1950); McGuigan
V. Heuer, 66 N.D. 710, 268 N.W. 679 (1936).
68. Hull et al. v. Rolfsrud, 65 N.W.2d 94 (N. D. 1954); Coulter et al. v. Ramberg,
79 N.D. 208, 55 N.W.2d (1952).
69. In re Heart River Irr. Dist., 78 N.D. 302, 49 N.W.2d 217 (1951).
70. N.D. Rev. Code 131-1002, subd. 4 (1943). State v. Seeb, 76 N.D. 473, 37 N.W.2d
341 (1949); State v. Olson, 61 N.D. 699, 240 N.W. 617 (1932); State v. Martin,
54 N.D. 840, 211 N.W. 585 (1926).
71. A similar provision will found in the Model Code rule 802.
72. McCormick, §325.
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likely to be disputed and proper subjects for judicial notice cannot,
however, be classified properly as matters of common knowledge.
Statistical facts, technological facts, historical facts and so on all
fall within the bounds of the Uniform rule. Courts have noticed
such matters of fact in the past by the use of a fiction - the judges
were merely " 'refreshing their memory' " as to a fact of common
knowledge.7" The more forward looking courts have recognized
facts of verifiable certainty as a separate and distinct basis for the
application of judicial notice.
7
1
The North Dakota Code does not contain a provision comparable
to the Uniform rule. But the principle is recognized indirectly in
one subdivision of Section 31-1002 which provides for judicial
notice "[o]f the facts stated in the almanac . and in various
other subdivisions of the Code authorizing judicial notice of such
facts requiring verification in authoritative sources.7., In addition,
there is a line of judicial authorities which hold that the courts may
take judicial notice of mortality tables. ' These decisions are based
on the mentioned fiction that such matters are matters of common
knowledge. The Uniform rule would remove this fictional aspect
of the law, yet not represent a significant departure from the estab-
lished North Dakota law. Indeed, the incorporation of such a rule
in the law would represent a forward step in the development of a
heretofore unrealized usefulness in the doctrine of judicial notice.
In the words of Professor McCormick:
* * * "[T] his shift of emphasis, from what needs no proof
to what can be verified with certainty by investigation, reveals
that judicial notice is not merely a substitute for formal proof
by witnesses but is itself another method of proof of certain
kinds of facts, namely, the method of research into profes-
sionally authoritative books and reports in the particular
field." * * * 7
The Criteria of Indisputability. As in the Model Code, the Uni-
form Rules limit judicial notice to indisputable facts. This limita-
tion upon the doctrine has been vigorously criticized by Professor
Davis. 7 He draws the useful distinction between adjudicative and
legislative facts- defining the former to be facts which concern
the parties to the controversy and the latter to-be facts which assist
the court in determining the content of law and policy - and points
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid.
75. N.D. Rev. Code §31-1002, subd. 22 (1943).
76. See note 50 supra.
77. McCormick, 712.
78. Davis, judicial Notice, 55 Col. L. Rev. 945 (1955).
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out his thesis with respect to the application of judicial notice as
to each of these types of facts as follows:
* * * "A human being is probably unable to consider a
problem - whether of fact, law, policy, judgment, or discretion
- without using his past experience, much of which may be
factual and much highly disputable. Judges and administra-
tors are at their best when they are well informed; their under-
standing and information must be used to the full if their de-
cisions are to be wise and sound. Fact finding, law making,
and policy formulation should be guided by experience and
understanding, not limited to wooden judgments predicated
upon the literal words of witnesses. Above all, judges and ad-
ministrative officers should make their policy choices on the
basis of all relevant facts, even though the kind of facts that
usually influence policy choices are often too elusive to be cap-
tured and penned up within a formal record. * * *
"The idea that facts can be found and that law and policy
can be either found or created in complex cases without using
any extra-record facts except those that are either indisputable
or contained in sources of indisputable accuracy seems con-
trary to the necessary behavior of all judges and officers who
are engaged in adjudication." * * * -
Professor Davis finds support for his thesis in both the positions
of two of the leading writers on the subject - Thayer and Wig-
more - and in some court decisions. Thayer wrote:
"Taking judicial notice does not import that the matter is in-
disputable. It is not necessarily anything more than a prima
facie recognition, leaving the matter still open to contro-
versy." * * * so
Similarly, Wigmore says:
"That a matter is judicially noticed means merely that it is
taken as true without the offering of evidence by the party who
should ordinarily have done so. This is because the Court as-
sumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be dis-
puted." * * * "I
The rationale of the criteria in the Model Code and the Uniform
Rules is probably best explained by Professor Morgan in a recent
series of lectures in which he has analyzed the position of Thayer
and Wigmore as not supported by the weight of authority and con-
cluded that to accept their doctrine would be to confuse the law
of judicial notice with the law of presumptions. He says:
* 0 * "'If the field of judicial notice contains both the dis-
putable and the indisputable, where is the line drawn? What
guide can counsel or a trial judge use? When do the rules of
79. Id. at.949.
80. Thayer, A Preliiinary Treatise on Evidence, 308 (1893).
81. 9 Wigmore, 1 2567.
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evidence come into operation, and when are the ordinary cri-
teria for directing a nonsuit or a verdict or finding applicable?
If all matters within the field are disputable, then all possible
questions as to the exact function of judicial notice and its rela-
tion to presumptions will demand answers. It is submitted that
not only theoretical symmetry but also practical considerations
strongly support the thesis that matter in the field of judicial
notice is not subject to attack by evidence. If there be a dis-
pute as to whether a matter is a subject of dispute, the question
to be answered is whether the matter lies within the field of
evidence or within the field of judicial notice; and the material
which may be presented or consulted in a search for the answer
is in no respect limited by the rules of evidence.' "-'
Professor Morgan recognizes that some appellate courts have ex-
tended judicial notice to include the disputable, but counsels the
dangers involved in such a practice.
* * "Indeed, some courts of last resort have, or seem to
have, assumed that knowledge of the segment of human ex-
perience known to their respective judges constitutes all that
can be known about human experience in general. There are
decisions of the United States Supreme Court declaring uncon-
stitutional legislation designed to change long accepted legal
concepts because the Court or a majority of its members deem-
ed to be incontrovertably true what many informed people and
some later courts believed to be demonstrably false. In such a
situation there is often no opportunity for the parties or their
counsel to be heard on the question whether the subject matter
is within the domain of judicial notice or the proposition deem-
ed incontestably true is accurately phrased. Litigants should
not be exposed to these risks." * * * 8:'
A fourth writer would require indisputability depending upon
whether adjudicative or legislative facts were involved. Professor
McCormick's text suggests that while the usual requirement for
certainty and indisputability ought to be observed when the court
proposes to take judicial notice of facts about the parties to the
controversy, their interests and transactions, it ought to be relaxed
"where the facts are often generalized and statistical and where
their use is more nearly argumentative, or as a help to value-judg-
ments . . ." in the furtherance of the function of courts in judicial
law-making. 14
It is questionable whether the requirement of indisputability
ought to be limited only to adjudicative facts. While recognizing
that there is a legitimate and necessary area. in which courts must
82. Morgan, Some Prohhcms of Proof Uloder the Anglo-American Systnit of Litigation
62 (1956).
83. Id. at 68.
84. McCormick, 705.
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function as law-makers,'8 it should also. be recognized -that their
decisions in such cases result in an adju6lication as between the
parties as well. Under such circumstances the parties ought to
have the opportunity to present evidence and argue the factual
basis for the decision when facts subject to reasonable dispute are
involved."" It protects the rights of the litigants and serves as a
check on the sound factual bases necessary to wise policy judg-
ments and rule-formulations which will serve as precedents in
future Jitigation between parties similarly situated.
In North Dakota it is quite clear that the doctrine is applied to
both adjudicative and legislative facts. To illustrate, the trial court
was taking judicial notice of an adjudicative fact when, to deter-
mine jurisdiction, it.noticed the limits of a county and the fact that
the place of a crime proved was within such limits.'! This is to be
distinguished from judicial notice of the fact that housing is scarce,
that slum conditions have appeared in the larger North Dakota
cities and that there is a need for low rent housing in holding the
North Dakota Housing Authorities Law constitutional."' This illu-
strates an application of the doctrine to legislative facts. These
cases are but illustrative of the decided cases in North Dakota
which can be distinguished on this basis. However, no case has
been found wherein it is evident that the doctrine has been extend-
ed to include matters reasonably subject to dispute as to either to
the mentioned two types of facts.-s
IV. Judicial Notice of Law and Related Facts
The Law. Pursuant to Rule 9(1) the judge is required to notice
"the common law, constitutions and public statutes in force in
every state, territory and jurisdiction of the United States . . ." As
to domestic law, Rule 9(1) is in accord with the common rule, '
the Model Code rule,"' and the law of North Dakota. By.statute,
every North Dakota court "will take judicial notice * * * [o]f the
public laws . . ." of the State. 2 No decisions have been found
interpreting this section of the statute. Nevertheless, the language
85. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, 98 et seq. (1922).
86. Compare McCormick, 705.
87. See note 46 supra.
88. N.D. Rev. Code c. 23-11 (1943), as amended, N.D. Sess. Laws 1949, c. 191.
Ferch v. Housing Authority of Cass County, 59 N.W.2d 849 (N.D. 1953).
89. The reader should be cautioned of the distinction, for example, between taking
judicial notice of the appearance of slum conditions generally and slum conditions in a
particular locality. See Ferch v. Housing Authority of Cass County, supra note 88.
90. 9 Wigmore § 2572; McCormick, 695.
91. Model Code rule 801.
92. N.D. Rev. Code § 31-1002, subd. 63 (1943).
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is sufficiently broad and definite to include the common law, con-
stitutions and public statutes enumerated in the Uniform Rule.
Likewise, the compulsory tenor of Rule 9(1) as to matters of do-
nmestic law necessarily applies with equal force in North Dakota9 3
Those holdings which purport to limit the application of Section
Ail-1002 only in response to a party request could not sensibly be
interpreted to apply to notice of the domestic law.a' Such an in-
terpretation would be contrary to the actual application of the doc-
trine in the adjudicative process in the State.
Rule 9(1) represents a complete departure from the common law
rule that notice will not be given to the public law of sister states.9"
In making notice of sister state law compulsory, the Rule goes
further than the corresponding provision of the Model Code which
provides for discretionary judicial notice unless it is requested by a
party.' The Model Code provision is a decided improvement over
the common law rule, but sound policy considerations may support
the more liberal Uniform rule that notice shall be taken of the pub-
lic law of sister states.' 7  Differences in language and the inacces-
sibility of source books- reasons for the common law rule de-
veloped by the English courts - do not ordinarily exist in Ameri-
can jurisprudence.' ' The provision in the Uniform Rules also rep-
resents an attempt to maintain uniformity with the Uniform Judicial
Notice of Foreign Law Act adopted by the Conference in 1936 by
making judicial notice of sister state law mandatory9 North Da-
kota adopted this Act in 1937. l"° However, the originally intended
compulsory effect of this statute was changed in the revision and
adoption of the 1943 Code. As enacted the statute provided that
93. See Burdick v. Farmers' Mercantile Co., 48 N.D. 227, 184 N.W. 4 (1921).
94. See page 12 et seq. supra.
95. McCormick, 696.
96. Model Code rules 802-803.
97. McCormick, 696.
98. Ibid.
99. Handbook, Nat'l. Conf. of Comm. on Uniform State Laws 355 et seq. (1936). See
also, the Comment to Rule 9, Handbook, 169 (1953).
100. N.D. Sess. Laws, c. 196 (1937). Prior to the enactment of this statute the law
provided that the courts would take judicial notice of the laws of sister states when the
printed and authenticated volumes were presented to the court for examination. N.D. Comp.
Laws § 7938, subd. 63 (1913), relied upon in State of North Dakota ex tel. Livingston v.
Rose, 41 N.D. 251, 170 N.W. 879 (1919). However, the statute does not appear to have
been consistently applied. See Paulus v. State of North Dakota, 58 N.D. 643, 227 N.W. 52
(1929), wherein the court refused to take judicial notice of a law of South Dakota under
which the defendant was organized because it was not pleaded.
Prior to the passage of the 1913 statute, supra, North Dakota adhered to the common
law rule. Kephart v. Continental Causualty Co., 17 N.D. 380, 116 N.W. 349 (1908);
Cuss v. Herman, 20 N.D. 295, 127 N.W. 78 (1910).
See also, Section 31-1002, subd. 80 of the 1943 N.D. Rev. Code providing for judicial
notice of the laws of a sister state for the purpose of giving credit to judicial proceedings
in that state and when the judgment of a sister state is impleaded. This provision would
appear to have been superseded by the enactment of the Judicial Notice of Foreign Laws
Act. supra, now Section. 31-1003 of the Code.
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"[e]very court of this state shall take judicial notice of the com-
mon law and statutes of every state, territory and other jurisdiction
of the United States." In the 1943 revision the word "will" was sub-
stituted for the word "shall" pursuant to the powers of the Code
Revision Commission under the Recodification Act.'"' The change
was made for clarification and to relate the Act - now Section
31-1003 - to the other statutes in the Code governing judicial
notice. 1 2 Therefore, the language in Section 31-1003 that the courts
"will take judicial notice" is subject to the same interpretation
given the similar language in Section 31-1002, namely, that the
courts will, when requested, take judicial notice of the particular
fact."' 3 This has been the result independent of the statute. In
Haggard v. First National Bank of Mandan, the Supreme Court
held that, in the absence of proof of the foreign law or a request
by a party that the court take judicial notice of that law, the law
of the sister state will be presumed to be the same as that of North
Dakota."1
4
It is unfortunate that Section 31-1003 is subject to this restric-
tive interpretation. The usual availability of materials needed for
ascertaining the law of a sister state makes the judicial notice pro-
visions far more acceptable than the so-called "presumption-tool."'' °
The dissimilarity which often exists between statutes and common
law rules in the various jurisdictions can lead to injustices through
an erroneous assumption that the law of the sister state is the same
as the local law."" The provision in the Uniform Rules requiring
judicial notice of foreign law is better.
Consistently with the Uniform Rules, North Dakota courts will
notice Federal public laws pursuant to Section 31-1003.'"7 Even
without the statute, North Dakota courts would notice Federal law
in accordance with the prevailing common law rule that state courts
will notice Federal public law on the theory that it is equally the
101. N.D. Sess. Laws c. 110 (1939).
102. N.D. Code Revision Report § 31-1003 (1943).
103. See the discussion at pages ........ supra. Cf. Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Ward County,
54 N.D. 75, 208 N.W. 768 (1926).
104. 72 N.D. 434, 8 N.W.2d 5 (1942). See N.D. Rev. Code § 31-1103 subd. 39 (1943)
which provides that it is a disputable presumption "[tlhat the foreign law is the same as
the law of this state." Other case authorities utilizing the presumption are Schooner v.
Meincke, 77 N.D. 96, 40 N.W.2d 803 (1950); Bowers v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 65 N.D.
384, 259 N.W. 99 (1935); Douglas County v. State Bank of Sutherland, 52 N. D. 617,
204 N.W. 683 (1925); Pratt v. Pratt, 29 N.D. 531, 151 N.W. 294 (1915).
See also, N.D. Rev. Code § 31-0901 (1943) providing for the admissibility of hooks
to prove the statutory and common law of sister state law and the law of foreign countries.
105. McCormick, 697.
106. Id. at n. 18.
107. N.D. Rev. Code 1 31-1003 (1943). Regional Agricultural Credit Corp. of Minne-
apolis v. Stewart, 69 N.D. 694, 289 N.W. 801 (1940).
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law of each state.'08 While the decisions are not entirely consistent
on the point, it appears that a party request is not necessary and the
courts may, in their discretion, notice Federal public law.-u9
The adoption of Rule 9 would not alter the present North Dakota
rules recognizing the public law of the several jurisdictions of the
United States as a proper subject of judicial notice. The change
would arise from requiring judicial notice of the public law of Fed-
eral and sister state jurisdictions.
Turning to those classes of law which are the subject of discre-
tionary judicial notice, Rule 9(2) (a) provides that a judge may
take judicial notice of the private acts and resolutions of Congress
and the legislature of the domestic state. Section 28-0730 of the
Code provides that a court shall take judicial notice of private
statutes when they are pleaded by title and day of passage"'
Section 28-0730 is not qualified jurisdictionally and no decisions
have been found which interpret the statute in this respect. Thus,
whether it is to be interpreted as including judicial notice of Fed-
eral acts ahd resolutions in addition to private statutes of the State
as provided in the Uniform Rules or is to be limited to the private
statutes of the State is a question left unsettled. A plausible argu-
ment can be made for the broader interpretation."' Many states
have adopted by statute what has been referred to as the "sensible
rule" of requiring judicial notice of all private acts." ' The lack of
source material in this State may be a deterrent in recommending
judicial notice of Federal private statutes. However, the general
plan of discretionary judicial notice under Rule 9(2) (a) coupled
108. Regional Agricultural Credit Corp. of Minneapolis v. Stewart, supra note 107;
Cinter v. Ginter, 63 N.W.2d 394 (N. D. 1954). 9 Wigmore, § 2573.
See also, the special provisions in Section 31-1002 of the 1943 N.D. Rev. Code providing
for judicial notice of the Federal Constitution (subd. 63); treaties (subd. 64-66); and
acts of Congress dealing with survey and dedication of lands within the states to educa-
tional institutions of the state (subd. 68).
109. See note 62 supra. Ginter v. Ginter, 63 N.W.2d 394, 398 (N.D. 1954) is the
latest decision on the point. The court said: "Courts may take judicial notict' of United
States statutes. ... But compare Regional Agricultural Credit Corp. of Minneapolis v.
Stewart, 69 N.D. 694, 289 N.W. 801 (1940), suggesting that judicial notice of Federal
public law is compulsory.
110. N.D. Rev. Code § 28-0730 (1943): "In pleading a private statute, or a ight
derived therefrom, it shall be sufficient to refer to such statute by its title and the day of
its passage and the court thereupon shall take judicial notice thereof."
111. Section 28-0730 is a procedural statute and procedural statutes are to be liberally
interpreted. See Smith v. Hoff, 20 N.D. 419, 127 N.W. 1047 (1910). 3 Sutherland,
Statutory Construction §f 6802 & 6809 (Horack, Jr. 1943). On this basis, it is to be
presumed that Section 28-0730 is designed to facilitate proof and achieve an expeditious
determination of the substantive rights of the parties and would not he interpreted to
prevent judicial notice of a Federal private act--or, for that matter, a private statute of a
sister state-if the litigant complied with the requirements of the statute.
112. 9 Wigmore, § 2572, n. 14; McCormick, 696, n. 9. Wigmore cites the North Da-
kota statute, along with those of other states, for his conclusion. However, in the absence
of decisions interpreting the statute it is not conclusive that the statute includes all private
acts. See note 108 supra.
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with the procedural safeguards in Rule 10 contemplate such a con-
tingency.1 '" The requirement of Section 28-0730 that. the private
statute be pleaded is analogous to Rule 9(3) providing for compul-
sory judicial notice upon the request of a party. The adoption of
the Uniform Rules would extend the existing law by giving the
judge the additional authority to notice federal and domestic state
private statutes in his discretion.
Rule 9(2) (a) further provides for discretionary judicial notice
of ordinances, published regulations of governmental subdivisions
or agencies of the domestic state and laws of foreign countries. The
Model Code provisions are the same.11 ' At common law ordinances
are not usually noticed although there is authority to the con-
trary." 5 With one exception, no statutory or case authority in North
Dakota has been found for judicial notice of ordinances. Section
40-1819 of the Code provides that the district court shall notice
ordinances of cities and villages in the case of appeals from deter-
minations in the police magistrate's court or in a court of th6 village
justice of peace as the case may be."' The liberalizing provision of
Rule 9(2) (a) would not be an unwarranted extension of the pres-
ent North Dakota law. The argument of unavailability of source
materials is counteracted by both the discretionary tenor of the
rule and the safeguards contained in Rule 10 pertaining to the
propriety of notice."'
Rule 9(2) (a) limits judicial notice of administrative rules and
regulations to those of the agencies of the domestic state. The rule
should be extended to include the Federal rules and regulations to
conform to North Dakota law. The advent of the Federal Register
and the strict rules governing the publication of rules and regula-
tions support what might otherwise be an unwarranted extension
of the doctrine." The Federal Register Act of 1935 provides that
"[t]he contents of the Federal Register shall be judicially noticed
... .,"9 It has been held that the states are bound by this provis-
113. See page 30 et seq. supra.
114. Model Code rule 802.
115. 9 Wigmore, 2572, n. 15; McCormick, 695.
116. N.D. Rev. Code § 40-1819 (1943): "On all appeals from a determination in a
police magistrate's court or in a court of a village justice of the peace, the district court
shall take judicial notice of all the ordinances of the city or of the village, as the case
may be."
117. See page 30 et seq. intra.
118. 9 Wigmore, 1 2572, n. 16. See also, Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 Col. L. Rev. 945,
947 (1955) and DeParq, The Uniform Rules of Evidence: A Plaintiff's View, 40 Minn.
L. Rev. 301, 301-308 (1956).
119. 49 Stat. 402, 44 U.S.C. § 307.
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ion,' 1' although a few courts have qualified the compulsory lan-
guage in the Federal statutes. 2" Even in the absence of this statute,
state courts now usually notice Federal administrative rules and
regulations."" Consistent with this view, the Supreme Court of
North Dakota has held recently that the courts of this state may
take judicial notice of Federal rules and regulations."" ' The ques-
tion dealing with what effect, if any, a request by a party would
have on the discretionary tenor of the holding was left undecided
by the court. Rule 9(3) would settle the question.
It has been suggested that Rule 9(2) (a) should be extended to
include Federal and domestic state agency decisions. '2" The sound-
hess of this proposal is not open to serious question in the light of
the procedural safeguards incorporated in Rule 10. There is no
reason why the court should be prevented from taking judicial
notice of these materials if it either has access to or is furnished
with the proper materials by the parties to enable it to do so.
The common law practice of refusing to take judicial notice of
the law of foreign countries prevails in all of the states except
seven.' 5 North Dakota adheres to the common law rule and re-
quires the parties to prove the foreign law. 12 It has been suggested
that "the flexible procedure of judicial notice, whereby the court is
free to get its information from any convenient source . . ." is a
desirable alternative to the cumbersome procedure and uncertain-
ties involved in the use of formal proof in the ascertainment of the
law of foreign countries.1
2
7
Facts Pertaining to the Personnel, Operation and Records of
Courts. Twenty-three subdivisions of Section 31-1002 of the Code
authorize judicial notice of various matters of fact pertaining to the
courts' functions. These may be classified generally into facts per-
120. Hall v. Bucher, 240 Mo. App. 1239, 227 S.W.2d 96 (1950); Fuller v. Minter,
215 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948); Morrison v. Hutchins, 158 Kan. 123, 144 P.2d
922 (1944).
121. Mogul Transp. Co. v. Larison, 181 Or. 252, 181 P.2d 139 (1947). The court
said: "In the case at bar, the [trial] court was not requested to take judicial notice. It was
not obligated to do so sua sponte." Compare Mastrullo v. Ryan, 328 Mass. 621, 105
N.E.2d 469 (1959), wherein the court said that " . . . if a party to litigation in the
courts of this commonwealth cares to rely upon [a federal regulation] he must bring it to
the notice of the trial judge."
122. McCormick, 695.
123. Ginter v. Ginter, 63 N.W.2nd 394 (N.D. 1954); Regional Agricultural Credit
Corp. of Minneapolis v. Stewart, 69 N.D. 694, 289 N.W. 801 (1940).
124. Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 Col. L. Rev. 945, 947 (1955).
125. McCormick, 698.
126. See Section 31-1005 of the N.D. Rev. Code of 1943 exempting the law of foreign
countries from the provisions of Section 31-1003 requiring judicial notice of the laws of
the several jurisdictions of the United States. See also, Section 31-0901 governing the proof
of the law of foreign countries and, in this connection, In re Petereson's Estate, 22 N.D.
480, 134 N.W. 751 (1912).
127. See note 125 supra.
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taining to the courts' jurisdictions,121 their terms,'2 their records
and judgments in prior and pending cases,'" the pendency of act-
ions, 131 and the identity of the courts and their officers.1" Under
the Uniform Rules judicial notice of these and related matters of
fact would fall within either one or the other of these subdivisions
of Rule 9(2) providing for notice of "such facts as are . . . gen-
erally known or of . . . common notoriety within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court" and "specific facts and propositions of
generalized knowledge which are capable of immediate and accu-
rate determination by resort to easily accessible sources of indis-
putable accuracy."
Notice of such matters of fact is justified on the grounds that the
judge either knows or has the special abilities for the ascertainment
of such facts."3 The adoption of the Uniform Rules would not
alter the existing law significantly. There is one case in which the
Supreme Court reversed the trial- court for taking notice of evi-
dence obtained in a prior proceeding between the parties partially
on the ground that it was beyond the scope of the facts enumerated
in the statute," '4 but there is justification for a contrary view."
The latter represents the better view.
136
The most significant change would be in the elimination of the
authorities interpreting Section 31-1002 to mean that a party re-
quest is a condition precedent to the application of judicial notice
to the court facts enumerated in Section 31-1002; "" The adoption
of the Uniform Rules would also clarify the inconsistency in the law
arising from this judicial interpretation of the statute and one de-
cision of the Supreme Court wherein it noticed the tenure of office
cf the justices of the Supreme Court of its own motion and inde-
pendent of the statute.," The Rules would recognize both proced-
tires by enabling the judge to take notice of such facts upon his own
motion, yet if it is requested, requiring him to do so. Under these
conditions the usefulness of judicial notice could be realized to its
fdllest extent as a means for shortening the litigation process where
128. N.D. Rev. Code f 31-1002, subd. 1, 4, 5 & 18 (1943).
129. Id. at subd. 13, 14 & 15.
130. Id. at subd. 2, 3, 17, 19 & 21.
131. Id. at subd. 6.
132. Id. at subd. 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 16, 45, 89, 91.
133. McCormick, 701.
134. Wickdim v. Arneson, 63 N.D. 594, 249 N.W. 709 (1933).
135. Cf. Amundson v. Wilson, 11 N. D. 193, 91 N.W. 37 (1902); Stead v. Manhart, 48
N.D. 536, 185 N.W. 1009 (1921); Cf. In re McKee's Estate, 67 N.D. 504, 274 N.W. 601
(1937).
136. See note 133 supra.
137. See note 135 supra.
138. State ex rel. Linde v. Robinson, 35 N.D. 417, 160 N.W. 514 (1916).
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facts involving the personnel, operation and records of the courts
ale relevant. Here again, there are no sound reasons why a judge
should be prevented, in his discretion, to notice such facts if he is
aware of them and the parties receive the benefit of the procedural
provisions in Rule 10.
Miscellaneous Governmental Facts. Pursuant to Section 31-1002,
North Dakota courts will also notice facts pertaining to state and
local governmental territory,'"' elections,4' the official signatures
and seals of office of the principal officers of the national and state
government,' the genuineness of signatures of officers of the
county in which the court is sitting,' 42 the acts of public officers and
their terms,' 4" and facts pertaining to the enactment of statutes in
the state,'44 such as notice of legislative journals.' 45 Judicial notice
of such matters of fact in the Uniform Rules would be authorized
either under Rule 9(1) pertaining to matters of fact within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court or those verifiable with certainty
in sources of indisputable accuracy."" .
At this point it is important to call attention to Rule 9(d) of the
Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure for North Dakota. In brief, this
Rule provides that when pleading an official document or act it is
sufficient to aver that such was done in compliance with law; or, if
pleading an ordinance, regulation, private statute, or the laws of
another jurisdiction, it is sufficient to refer to the title and date of
approval of such matter of law.' '"
While there is no apparent conflict between this provision and
Uniform Evidence Rule 9, in the event both procedural reforms
were adopted, it should at least be made clear in the civil procedure
139. N.D. Rev. Code § 31-1002, subd. 35-40, 46, 55 & 68 (1943).
140. Id. at subd. 47.
141. Id. at subd. 89.
142. Id. at subd. 42.
143. Id. at subd. 41-44.
144. Id. at subd. 41-44.
145. Id. at subd. 75 & 76.
146. See Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 Col. L. Rev. 945, 947-948 (1955). Professor Davis
would disagree to the extent that commentaries on the law, legislative history and historical




6a. The complcte text of Rule 9(d) reads as follows: "Official Document or Act. In
pleading an official document or official act it is sufficient to aver that the document was
issued or the act done in compliance with law; and in pleading any ordinance or regulation
of a county, city, village, or other political subdivision, or any special, local or private
statute or any right derived therefrom, or the laws of another jurisdiction, it is sufficient to
refer to the ordinance, regulation, statute, or law by its title and date of its approval or in
some other manner with convenient certainty."
This rule supersedes Section 28-0730 of the Code which is set forth at note 110 supra.
See Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure p. 117.
Incidentally, the Rule also raises a question of constnction. Does "laws of another
jurisdiction" include the before mentioned ordinances, regulations, and special, local or
plivate statutes? Or. does it just mean laws other than those specifically enumerated? The
latter is probably what is meant. If so, should the rule be thus confined?
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Pule 9(d) that it is in no way to be construed as a limitation upon
the application. of judicial notice to these matters as provided in
Rule 9 of the Evidence Rules. The same is-true of Rule 9(e) deal-
ig with the pleading of judgments in-so-far as they might be made
the subject of judicial notice under the Uniform Evidence Rules."""
V. Procedural Provisions
RULE 10. Determination as to Propriety of Judicial Notice and
Tenor of Matter Noticed. With one exception to be mentioned
later, the substance of Uniform Rule 10 is also contained in the
Model Code."17 Rule 10(1) provides:
"The judge shall afford each party reasonable opportunity to
present to him information relevant to the propriety of taking
judicial notice of a matter or to the tenor of the matter to be
noticed."
The framers of the Model Code and the Uniform Rules have
been criticized because of the mandatory nature of the formulation
in Rule 10(1), that is, that the judge "shall" afford each party an
opportunity to present information.)4 8 It is true that courts take
judicial notice of many things in preparing findings of fact and
conclusions of law, such as the meaning of language and other mat-
ters of common knowledge which would require no investigation
regarding the propriety of notice. In this respect Rule 10(1)
could not be construed literally. "Common sense demands a reason-
able discretion for the judge to determine whether fairness re-
quires such notification.""' 9 The rule would be more literally in
accord with the basic theory of judicial notice if it were discretion-
ary rather than mandatory in nature.'- 1
A rule similar to Rule 10(1) does not obtain in North Dakota
although the same result is effected when one of the enumerated
matters of fact in Section 31-1002 is involved if the court follows
those authorities holding that an application of the doctrine under
the statute must be initiated by a party request.' Under such cir-
cumstances the parties undoubtedly would have the opportunity to
present data to the judge concerning the propriety of notice. How-
ever, we have observed that this intrepretation of the statute has
146b. Rule&9(e) reads as follows; "Judgment. In pleading a judgment or decision of a
domestic or foreign court, judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal, or of a board or officer, it is
sufficient to aver the judgment or decision, without setting forth matter showing jurisdiction
to render it."
147. Model Code rule 804.
148. Davis, supra note 146 at 974 et seq.
149. McCormick, 708.
150. See Part I of this paper, supra at page 5.
1.51. See page 12 et seq. supra.
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not always been relied upon by the courts in taking judicial notice.
In the latter case, the courts have not considered the necessity for
notice to the party when the judge proposes to use the doctrine.
In many of these there would plainly not be a need for such notice
to the parties because of the notoriety of the fact involved. If Uni-
form Rule 10(1) were amended to give the judge discretion to
determine whether the tenor of the matter in question was such
that the parties should be given the opportunity to present infor-
mation on the propriety of notice it would be more iin accord with
what, it is submitted, has resulted in practice in the application of
judicial notice in North Dakota.
Uniform Rule 10(2) provides:
"In determining the propriety of taking judicial notice of a
matter or the tenor thereof, (a) the judge may consult and use
any source of pertinent information, whether or not furnished
by a party, and (b) no exclusionary rule except a valid claim
of privilege shall apply."
Part (a) of this rule is substantially in accord with that portion
of Section 31-1001 which provides that the judge "may refer to any
person, document, or book of reference for his satisfaction" in de-
termining whether he shall notice a fact. ' , Similarly, if judicial
notice of foreign law is involved, the North Dakota statute provides
that "the court may inform itself of such laws in such manner as it
may deem proper and may call upon counsel to aid it in obtaining
such information."'"' There are no authorities dealing specifically
with Uniform Rule 10(2) (b). However, Section 31-1001 declares
that evidence is not applicable to matters of which a court will
take judicial notice. This, coupled with the provision authorizing
tie judge to consult any pertinent source brings the law of North
Dakota into accord with the provision in the Uniform Rules. There
iL no authority dealing with the exception in the Rule with respect
to privileges, but it is supported by sound considerations of public
policy.
Uniform Rule 10(3) provides:
"If the information possessed by or readily available to the
judge, whether or not furnished by the parties, fails to convince
him that a matter falls clearly within Rule 9, or if it is insuffi-
cient to enable him to notice the matter judicially, he shall
decline to take judicial notice thereof."
This rule is essential. The matter of fact will either fall within
the realm of evidence or judicial notice and it is the judges function
152. N.D. Rev. Code # 31-1001 (1943).
153. Id. at 1 31-1003.
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to decide this question. 5 ' While no authorities in North Dakota
have been found which have considered each aspect of this rule,
one opinion of the Supreme Court clearly indicates a discretionary
power in the judge, based upon the information made available to
him, to decide whether judicial notice will be applied.'15
Uniform Rule 10(4) provides:
"In any event the determination either by judicial notice or
from evidence of the applicability and the tenor of any matter
of common law, constitutional law, or of any statute, private
act, resolution, ordinance or regulation falling within Rule 9,
shall be a matter for the judge and not for the jury."
A similar provision will not be found in the Model Code. Rule
10(4) would appear to be a redundancy since the matters enumer-
ated therein are judicially noticed pursuant to Rule 9.151 If it is a
matter for judicial notice then it is not a question of fact for the
jury to determine and a declaration to that effect seems unneces-
sary. The rule was incorporated as a precautionary measure but
it is not essential.
15
-
Evidentiary Rebuttal of Noticed Facts. Uniform Rule 11 reads as
follows i
"RULE 11. Instructing the Trier of Fact as to Matter Judi-
cially Noticed. If a matter judicially noticed is other than the
common law or constitution or public statutes of this state, the
judge shall indicate for the record the matter which is judicial-
ly noticed and if the matter would otherwise have been for
determination by a trier of fact other than the judge, he shall
instruct the trier of fact to accept as a fact the matter so
noticed."
This rule first raises the question of whether a matter of fact is
subject to dispute by the adversary by formal evidence after the
judge determines that the fact is one which, within the scope of the
Rules, is to be noticed. Consistent with their theory that taking
judicial notice of a fact is nothing more than presuming- or as-
suming-the existence of a fact until the contrary is shown,
Thayer, Wigmore and Davis adhere to the view that the opponent
is not prevented from disputing a noticed fact by evidence if he
believes it to be disputable." 8 Morgan and McCormick believe
that the weight of reason supports the view that when a fact is
154. McCormick, 708.
155. See Amundson v. Wilson, 11 N.D. 193, 91 N.W. 37 (1902).
156. Laughlin, Judicial Notice, 40 Minn. L. Rev. 365, 381 (1956).
157. Ibid. Handbook, Nat'l. Conf. of Comm. on Uniform State Laws 170 (1953).
158. Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence 308 (1898); 9 Wigmore 1 2567;
-Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 Col. L. Rev. 945, 978 (1955).
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noticed it necessarily precludes the adverse party from offering
contradictory evidence.'
If the criteria in Rule 9 that courts can only notice indisputable
facts is sound, then it necessarily follows that the latter view must
be accepted., "' Thus, Rule 11 provides that the judge must in-
struct the jury to accept as a fact the matter noticed. It is in accord
with the weight of authority and appears to be the law of North
Dakota. Section 31-1002 of the Code provides:
"No evidence of any fact of which the courts take judicial
notice need be given in any civil or criminal action or proceed-
ing pending in this state by the party alleging its existence...
It is to be noted that this statute expressly provides that only the
party seeking to avail himself of the doctrine is relieved of proof
Therefore, when this statute is read in connection with that provis-
ion of the Code providing that "[t]he court in charging the jurors
shall instruct only as to the law of the case", an argument could be
made for the proposition that evidence contradicting a fact noticed
could be introduced by the opponent.'' However, the case law on
the subject is inconsistent with this position. In the early case of
Power v. Bowdle, the trial court was reversed for failing to notice
that abbreviated symbols on tax rolls were insufficient descriptions
under the general usage in the state for land taxed."-2 In the course
o'f its opinion the court said:
* * * "But shall so important a matter as the existence or
nonexistence of a general usage of language or symbol writing
in describing land turn upon the varying financial abilities of
suitors, or the uncertain vigilance of counsel in arraying testi-
mony, where the amount of the testimony, from the nature of
the case, is practically inexhaustible? * * *
"[Matters of which the courts will take judicial notice] ought
not to be left to the chances of nisi prius trials, and be permit-
ted to be proved or disproved, as it might turn out." * * 163
This is substantiated in at least two decisions of the Supreme
Court wherein the trial court was affirmed in instructing the jury
to accept without proof matters of fact of which it had been deter-
159. Morgan, Some Problems of Proof Under the Anglo-American System of Litigation
48 et seq. (1956); McCormick, 711.
160. Professor McCormick says that the criteria of indisputability is inapplicable to leeis-
lative facts. See page 21 supra. If this is so, his position that the parties should 11ot
be permitted to contradict matters of fact appears to he inconsistent. See Davis, Judicial
Notice, 55 Col. L. Rev. 945, 946 at n. 134 (1955). He reconciles his position by equating
judicial notice of legislative facts with the law, namely, that they are within the special
competance of the judge. McCormick, 710.
161. N.D. Rev. Code § 28-1411 (1943).
162. 3 N.D. 107, 54 N.D. 404 (1893).
163. Id. at 409.
1957]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
mined should be noticed.'6 4 The bulk of the decisional law in North
Dakota is inarticulate on the question. However, the authorities
just mentioned represent a view which is sound in reason and in
accord with the weight of authority. 165 Uniform Rule 11 would
clarify the North Dakota law.
In addition to his criticism of the criteria of indisputability in the
Uniform Rules, Professor Davis also argues that the failure to per-
mit contradictory evidence precludes a re-examination of the ruling
that the fact is indisputable and will not be noticed.'66 But this de-
emphasizes the importance of the informal investigation provided
for in Uniform Rule 10(2) which precedes the determination of
whether a fact will be noticed and ignores Rule 12(2) which pro-
vides for a review of the rulings of the judge on the propriety of
notice.161 Or, as suggested previously, even if the judge should
have the discretion under Rule 10(1) to determine whether notice
to the parties is essential before taking judicial notice of a fact, the
judge's determination would still be subject to review in those cases
where he did not believe the fact was such as to require him to
notify the parties of his intention to notice such fact.6 8 The-rights
of the parties seem fully protected under Rule 11.
Rule. 11 requires two things of the judge. He must: (1) indicate
for the record the matter which is judicially noticed unless it is the
common law, constitution or public statutes of the domestic state;
and (2) instruct the trier of fact to accept as a fact the matter
which .is noticed unless he is the trier of fact. The first goes farther
than the corresponding Model Code rule 805 by requiring a record
entry of not only matters of fact, but matters of foreign law which
have .been noticed. 6 9 Rule 11 is probably better since judicial
notice of matters of law other than the common law, constitution,
and public statutes of the domestic state is the exception rather
than the rule and record notice would assist the parties and the
appellate tribunals in being fully appraised of the action of the
trial court.. The second requirement necessarily follows if the mat-
164. State v. Swift, 53 N.D. 916, 208 N.W. 388 (1926); Ruehl v. Lidgerwood Rural
Telephone Co., 23 N.D. 6, 135 N.W. 793 (1912).
165. McCormick, 711.
166. Davis, Judicial Notice,, 55 Col. L. Rev. 945, 979 (1955).
167. See page 31 supra.
168. See page 31 supra.
169. Model Code rule 805 provides: "If a matter judicially noticed would, in. the
absence of such notice, be determined by the trier of fact, the judge, "
(a) if the trier of fact, shall include in the record of the trial a statement of
the matter as so noticed;
(b) if not the trier of fact, shall direct the trier to find the matter as so noticed."
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ter is one which it would have been within the province of the jury
to determine and is the same as the Model Code rule.1
7
11
A comparison of Rule 11 and the Model Code rule also indicates
one further minor difference. Where a judge is sitting with a jury
and judicial notice of a matter of fact is involved, Rule 11 re-
quires both a record entry of the fact noticed and an instruction to
the jury; the Model Code rule would only require an instruction to
the jury in such circumstances. The Model Code rule is complete
enough in this respect since the instructions become a part of the
record, but there is nothing wrong with the rule as stated in the
Uniform Rules.
It has been suggested that Rule 10(1) be amended to give the
judge discretion to afford the parties an opportunity to present in-
formation on the propriety of notice.t 7' Similarly, the mandatory
language in Rule 11 could not be followed literally as to matters of
fact. When judicial notice is used as a part of the reasoning pro-
cess, matters of fact of general notoriety are necessarily applied and
it would seem quite impossible to either make a record entry or in-
struct the jury as to such matters. If the case is tried with a jury it
will necessarily apply such matters sua sponte.'7-' The record entry
or instruction to the jury seems most necessary when judicial notice
is used as a substitute for evidence.
RULE 12. Judicial Notice in Proceedings Subsequent to Trial.
In substance this rule is the same as Model Code rule 806. Rule
12(1) provides:
"The failure or refusal of the judge to take judicial notice of
a matter, or to instruct the trier of fact with respect to the mat-
ter, shall not preclude the judge from taking judicial notice of
the matter in subsequent proceedings in the action."
No authority in North Dakota has been found dealing with the
substance of this rule, but there could certainly be no objection to
it.' Neither the trial judge or the reviewing court should be
bound by the prior failure to take judicial notice of a matter within
the scope of the Uniform Rules.
Rule 12(2) provides:
"The rulings of the judge under Rules 9, 10 and 11 are sub-
ject to review."
170. Ibid.
171. See page 31 supra.
172. Compare State v. Swift, 53 N.D. 916, 208 N.W. 388 (1926), wherein the Su-
preme Court held that it was not error for the trial court to instruct the jury that it might
take into account things of common knowledge, such as the laws of nature, measure of
time and so on as though evidence had been introduced establishing the same.
173. Laughlin, judicial Notice, 40 Minn. L. Rev. 365, 385 (1956).
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A provision for review first appeared in the Uniform Judicial
Notice of Foreign Law Act.17 4 The Act was in derogation of the
common law rule that matters of sister state law were jury ques-
tions and a provision for review of the court determination of the
propriety of notice of foreign law was deemed essential. 17 5 Later
the same reasoning resulted in the incorporation of a similar rule in
the Model Code.76
A review of the rulings of trial judges on the propriety of notice
would not be novel in North Dakota. It is expressly provided for
in the statute governing notice of foreign law as a result of the
adoption of the Uniform Act.1 7 7 The adoption of the Uniform
Rules would conform to existing North Dakota law with respect to
notice of sister state law and the provision for review might thus
seem unnecessary. However, the provision for discretionary judicial
notice of the law of foreign countries under Rule 9(2) is contrary
to existing North Dakota law which treats the existence of such law
as a question of fact.17 1 Under these circumstances, it should be
made clear that rulings on the propriety of notice of the law of
foreign countries is reviewable the same as rulings on other mat-
ters of judicial notice. Moreover, the absence of a specific statutory
provision dealing with review of determinations on the propriety
of judicial notice in North Dakota lends weight to the desirability
of such provision should the rules be adopted.
Rule 12(3) provides:
"The reviewing court in its discretion may take judicial
notice of any matter specified in Rule 9 whether or not judi-
cially noticed by the judge."
This rule articulates the overwhelmingly accepted practice in
North Dakota and deserves no further comment.
Finally, Rule 12(4) provides:
"A judge or a reviewing court taking judicial notice under
Paragraph (1) and (3) of this rule of matter not theretofore
so noticed in the action shall afford the parties reasonable op-
portunity to present information relevant to the propriety of
taking such judicial notice and to the tenor of the matter to be
noticed."
Consistent with the suggestion made in the discussion of Rule
10(1), the mandatory nature of the rule should be modified to give
the judge or reviewing court discretion to determine whether the
174. Handbook, Nat'l. Conf. of Comm. on Uniform State Laws 357 (1936).
175. Ibid.
176. Model Code rule 806.
177. N.D. Rev. Code 5 31-1003 (1943).
178. See note 126 supra.
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nature of the fact is such that it reasonably calls for an opportunity
for the parties to present information before judicial notice is taken
of that fact. 1"n Reviewing courts as well as trial courts necessarily
apply fact and law at every stage of the law suit which would not
be challenged. Notification should be discretionary if the dual
function of judicial notice suggested at the outset of this paper is to
lie recognized completely and realistically accord with the practice
of courts in the decisional process both in North Dakota and else-
where.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The Uniform Rules. With perhaps a few exceptions, the Rules
conform to the basic notions which, it has been suggested, form the
rationale of the doctrine; they are in harmony with the view of the
leading writers concerning its scope; and they contain the accepted
procedural safeguards necessary to an application of the doctrine.
To the end that the Rules may further be improved, five sugges-
tions for changes are submitted for consideration. These are:
(1) to amend Rules 10(1) and 12(4) with appropriate language
giving the judge discretion to determine whether notice to the
parties giving them an opportunity to present information on the
propriety of his use of the doctrine is warranted by the nature of
the matter to be noticed;
(2) to amend Rule 11 with language which would relieve the
judge of the obligation to make a record entry and to instruct the
jury on matters wherein notice to the parties would not be war-
ranted by the nature of the facts involved;
(3) to amend Rule 9(1) to read "of common notoriety" rather
than "as are so universally known";
(4) to amend Rule 9(2) (a) to include Federal rules and regu-
lations to conform to North Dakota law and to include Federal and
state agency decisions; and
(5) to delete Rule 10(4) providing that questions pertaining to
judicial notice of the law are matters for the judge and not the jury.
The necessary implication of Rule 9(1) providing for compulsory
judicial notice is that the doctrine is recognized as a necessary per-
ceptive element in the judicial process, that is, that there are certain
matters which the courts must notice without which it would be
quite impossible for them to function. The first two changes are
proposed as desirable to give full meaning to this recognition of
jitdicial notice as essential to judicial reasoning and bring the Rule
179. See page 31 supra.
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into accord with the practice that exists in the several jurisdictions,
including North Dakota, in the application of the doctrine. At the
same time, the changes would not render the application of Rule
10(1), 12(4) and 11 ineffective when judicial notice is used as a
substitute for formal proof. If the dual aspect of judicial notice
suggested at the outset of this paper is accepted, then these pro-
posals follow as necessary corollaries.
The third proposal would avoid the use of a fiction in the Rules.
The fourth would not appear to be an unwarranted extension of the
doctrine, particularly with regard to the law in North Dakota
authorizing judicial notice of Federal rules and regulations. Final-
ly, there would be no harm in retaining Rule 10(4), but it is not
necessary.
The Rules and the Law. Notoriety and verifiability in the Rules
as distinguished from precedent in the North Dakota law would
cffect a more sound theoretical basis for judicial notice, facilitate
its present application uninhibited by statutory enumeration and
provide a self-adjusting framework for the application of the doc-
trine to new times and new circumstances. At the same time, the
Rules - either in their present or suggested amended form -
would not change the scope of the subject matter of judicial notice
in North Dakota appreciably.
As to matters of fact, common knowledge as a basis for judicial
notice is recognized in both the Rules and the law irrespective of
w.hether it is "universally known" or known only within the terri-
torial jurisdiction of the court. The North Dakota statutory provis-
ions do not use the terminology "universally known" and no decis-
ions have been found in which it is used when matters of general
i-otoriety are involved. The change in terminology in the law would
probably have no effect, but-it seems preferable to adopt the sug-
gested amendatory language. Rule 9(2) (d) authorizing judicial
i-otice of facts verifiable with certainty would introduce a new
principle as a basis for judicial notice in North Dakota, but it would
not change the presently recognized application of the doctrine to
such matters of fact.
The changes in judicial notice of the law would be few. As
written, the Rules would extend the law to. include notice of the
lvw of foreign countries, expressly provide for notice of Federal
private statutes and authorize notice of ordinances of the State
municipalities without qualification. In the suggested amended
form, the Rules would further extend the law to include Federal
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and state agency decisions and retain the present North Dakota
rule authorizing notice of Federal rules and regulations.
The law does not presently contain a clear distinction governing
the initiating factors in the-use of judicial notice. The provisions in
the Uniform Rules providing for the compulsory, discretionary, or
compulsory upon request, application of the doctrine would pro-
vide a needed change - or clarification - in the law. The analysis
has demonstrated that this is probably the most needed reform.
However, the resultant conclusion. should not be that the adoption
of this feature of the Rules would suffice without the adoption of
the whole.
The procedural provisions would fill some noticeable gaps in the
law. These include Rules 10(1) and 12(4) -if amended as sug-
gested - providing for notice to the parties of the intention to use
judicial notice; Rule 11 governing record entries of matters noticed
and instructions to the jury; and the provisions of Rule 12 providing
for judicial notice of matters in subsequent proceedings and by the
reviewing court and the review of rulings on the propriety of
notice.
Repeal. The adoption of Uniform Rules 9-12 in North Dakota
Would require a repeal of Chapter 31-10 of the North Dakota Re-
vised Code of 1943 which includes Sections 31-1001 to 31-1005.
In addition, Section 28-0730 pertaining to judicial notice of private
statutes and Section 40-1819 authorizing judicial notice of ordi-
nances in all appeals from decisions of the police magistrate and
justice of the peace courts would-be superseded by Rule 9(2) (a)
and should be repealed. Similarly, Section 40-0103 providing for
judicial notice of the existence and change of organization of muni-
cipalities would be rendered, obsolete by either Rule 9(2) (c) or
(d) authorizing judicial notice of -Matters of fact of common noto-
riety within the territorial jurisdiction of the court and specific
facts and propositions of verifiable certainty.
Section 28-2906 of the Code authorizes judicial notice "of the
situation of producers and laborers when prices of farm products
are confiscatory . . ." This provision was enacted as an aid in
giving relief from default judgments and other hardship cases in-
volving the agricultural community in North Dakota."'1 While the
rature of the fact involved is such as would permit judicial notice
under the Uniform Rules, it would probably be in the interests of
180. N.D. Rev. Code § 28-2904 (1943).
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the policy expressed in the statutes to retain this provision in the
event the Rules are adopted.
Section 31-0901 provides for the admissibility of books as evi-
dence of the law of sister states and foreign countries.',, This
statute does not conflict with Uniform Rule 9 as such. If judicial
notice of these laws is not feasible under the circumstances of the
particular case, then the law would have to be proved in the usual
way. However, in the interests of the underlying policy of the
Rules, the statute should be amended to indicate clearly that it was
only applicable for purposes of proving foreign law by evidence
when judicial notice could not be applied.
Section 31-1103 provides that it is a disputable presumption that
the foreign law is the same as the law of North Dakota.112 While
this statute does not conflict with the Uniform Rules as such, it is
contrary to their policy and should be repealed.
Section 28-1411 provides, inter alia, that the court shall instruct
the jury only as to the law of the case.'"' This provision of the
statute should be amended to reconcile it with Rule 11 providing
for instructions to the jury on matters of fact noticed.
It is to be observed that the changes resulting from an adoption
of Uniform Rules 9-12 in North Dakota would manifest progressive
improvement rather than revolutionary change. Further, it would
establish rules permitting a more extensive use of the doctrine in
this State, particularly in the area of discretionary judicial notice.
The unrealized usefulness of the doctrine might thereby be at-
tained.
*.. "Courts may judicially notice much which they can-
not be required to notice. That is well worth emphasizing, for
it points to a great possible usefulness in this doctrine, in help-
ing to shorten and simplify trials; it is an instrument of great
capacity in the hands of a competent judge; and is not nearly
as much used, in the region of practice and evidence, as it
should be. This function is, indeed, a delicate one; if it is too
loosely or ignorantly exercised it may annul the principles of
evidence and even of substantive law. But the failure to exer-
cise it tends to smother trials with technicality, and monstrous-
ly lengthens them out."14
(To Be Continued)
181. N.D. Rev. Code § 31-0901 (1943)
182. Id. at § 31-1003, subd. 39.
183. The statute reads: "The court in charging the jurors shall instruct only as to the
law of the case
184. Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence 309 (1898). See also McCormick,
.331.
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